Verification

Verify a transaction

Every EigenSelect selection publishes its evidence to two independent channels before and after physical execution. Neither channel belongs to the web server that showed you this page, and neither requires an account, an API key, or our cooperation to query.

1 · The commitment chain

Before the quantum processor is contacted, every parameter of your selection is fixed in a commitment manifest and its SHA‑256 digest is published. After resolution, a second record documents the outcome. The records bracket the physical event: what was promised, then what was measured.

Pre-commitment pre.<transaction>.eigenselect.eu, published before the QPU job is submitted. It covers the canonical outcome list, the state→outcome mapping, the transpiled circuit, the backend identity, the shot count (1), and the rejection policy. Each is carried by its own hash, all bound into one manifest digest.
Post-resolution post.<transaction>.eigenselect.eu, published on resolution. It covers every physical attempt in order (including the rejected measurements), the accepted bitstring, and the resolved outcome.
Multi-draw Structured draws carry one record pair per pick: pre.2.<transaction>.eigenselect.eu for the second pick, and so on. Each pick is committed and resolved independently.

2 · Check the DNS records

Using any terminal:

dig TXT pre.a7f3e9c2.eigenselect.eu +short
dig TXT post.a7f3e9c2.eigenselect.eu +short
Any resolver answers these queries. The parent .eu registry has delegated eigenselect.eu to our nameservers since 15 August 2026 and publishes the DS record that chains the zone's signatures to the root. Drop +short and a validating resolver shows ad in the header flags; add +dnssec to see the signatures themselves. To ask an authoritative server directly, append @ns1.eigenselect.com; the answer is the same. Some earlier reports print the same queries with @ns1.eigenselect.com appended; that form still works.

Substitute your transaction ID (it is on your report and in your delivery email). A pre-commitment record looks like this:

"v=es1 t=pre h=sha256:9f86d081884c7d659a2feaa0c55ad015a3bf4f1b2b0b822cd15d6c15b0f00a08 n=9 d=1/1 ts=2026-07-15T14:30:00Z"

The digest h is reproduced in full in your report, together with the manifest it commits to, so you can recompute it yourself. The zone is served by two authoritative nameservers we operate, ns1.eigenselect.com in Amsterdam and ns2.eigenselect.com in Warsaw, and is DNSSEC-signed. The DS record for its key (tag 29820, ECDSA P-256) is published at the .eu registry, so a validating resolver checks the whole chain from the root down to each record.

ns1 is dual-stack; ns2 answers on IPv6 only, since we released its IPv4 address on 16 August 2026. Both addresses were procured in July on our inference that the .eu registry required them. The requirement was ours, not the registry's; we itemize what the remaining address costs, and correct the account, on the Infrastructure Transparency page. A resolver without IPv6 reaches the zone through ns1; every other resolver reaches both nodes.

3 · Recompute the commitment yourself

The h= field in that record is a digest of the commitment manifest: the outcome list, the state mapping, the circuit, the backend, the shot count, and the rejection policy, bound together. The manifest is served in its exact canonical form, so you can hash it and check it against what DNS has been serving since before the processor was contacted.

curl -s https://eigenselect.com/verify/a7f3e9c2/1/manifest.json | shasum -a 256
dig TXT pre.a7f3e9c2.eigenselect.eu +short

The manifest commits to the circuit by hash. The circuit that physically ran is served the same way, so that hash is checkable too:

curl -s https://eigenselect.com/verify/a7f3e9c2/1/circuit.qasm | shasum -a 256

That value appears as circuit.qasm_sha256 inside the manifest you just hashed. The chain closes: the DNS record fixes the manifest, the manifest fixes the circuit, and the circuit is the one the processor executed. No step requires an account, an API key, or our cooperation. Every record for a transaction is collected on its verification page, at /verify/<transaction>.

4 · Check the Nostr events

The same one-line records are published as signed, non-replaceable events (kind 1) on public Nostr relays, creating a second, independently operated evidence channel. Events are signed by the EigenSelect publication key:

public key (hex): 6d6f58ca01f899ce9a3ef37802db4af4aa5b9d9f489b0b0aeecefe4b009eeab3
relays:           wss://nos.lol · wss://relay.damus.io · wss://relay.primal.net

Any Nostr client can retrieve the event by the event ID printed in your report. The event content is byte-identical to the DNS TXT record. Two channels, one commitment.

5 · What verification demonstrates

EigenSelect can demonstrate:

  1. A specific canonical selection manifest produced a specific digest.
  2. That digest was published through the configured channels before the recorded QPU job was submitted.
  3. The provider returned a recorded measurement associated with that job.
  4. The reported outcome follows deterministically from the committed mapping and the accepted measurement.
  5. Rejected measurements, retries, and terminal failures are included in the report.

EigenSelect cannot independently demonstrate:

  1. That the provider's backend metadata is truthful.
  2. That the provider's reported measurement originated from the stated physical device.
  3. That the physical output distribution was perfectly uniform.
  4. That public Nostr relays will retain an event indefinitely.
  5. That a DNS record's internal timestamp independently establishes when it was first published.
  6. That the selection satisfies any legal, regulatory, contractual, or procedural requirement.
  7. That both nameservers are reachable from every resolver. ns2 is IPv6-only since 16 August 2026, so a resolver without IPv6 connectivity reaches ns1 alone. Both nodes serve identical, identically signed records; the matter is documented on the transparency page.

DNS records are also mutable by us, and we hold the DNSSEC signing keys. DNSSEC protects the records against third-party tampering in transit, not against their operator. The value of the commitment chain is external observability at the time of the event, not permanent immutability. Your report states all of this in its technical appendix, because a verification chain that overstates itself is not a verification chain.